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Abstract
 
Auditor independence is a cornerstone of the auditing profession and the basic principle that 
underpins the reputation of the auditing profession in the public eye. Indeed, it is the attribute most 
demanded from auditors by the public. Therefore, the sustainability of the auditing profession depends 
on how auditors can protect this principle. This dissertation consists of four interrelated essays 
concerned with auditor independence. Specifically, it examines situations that can threaten and impair 
auditor independence. In addition, this dissertation also examines several variables that may enhance 
and protect auditor independence.
The first essay aims to examine the impact of social pressures occurring within audit firms on
auditors’ judgment in the setting of a society with “high power distance” and “low individualism” 
cultural dimensions. The social pressures consisted of obedience pressure exerted by an auditor’s 
superior and conformity pressure exerted by an auditor’s colleague. Moreover, two moderating 
variables—a multi-dimensional professional commitment and locus of control—were included as 
moderator variables in the relationship between the social pressures faced by auditors and their 
judgment. The findings show that obedience and conformity pressures influence auditor judgment. 
Auditors who face the social pressures will make a judgment that may be even diametrically opposite 
to the independence principle. The findings also indicate that a multi-dimensional professional 
commitment and locus of control may potentially influence auditor judgment in a situation with social 
pressures.
The second essay aims to investigate the association of advocacy and familiarity threats 
caused by auditor fee dependence and auditor tenure on auditor independence based on Finnish data, 
law, and auditing environment. This essay was motivated by the Green Paper on Audit Policy, 
published by the European Commission in 2010 that questions whether the maximum fee collected 
from a client should be regulated and whether consecutive assignments should be limited, among 
others. Contrary to popular belief, this essay does not find evidence that audit fees and long auditor 
tenure will jeopardise auditor independence. Therefore, the findings do not support policies to 
regulate auditor fees or limit auditor tenure in Finland.
The third essay aims to examine the effect of client intimidation on auditor independence in 
an audit-client conflict situation. Intimidation threat is one of five independence threats that are 
explicitly referenced in the IFAC’s independence framework. Client intimidation was manifested in 
the client threatening to replace the auditor if the auditor did not adopt the client’s position. In 
addition, this essay examines the role of auditor’s perceived pressure and multi-dimensions of 
professional commitment as moderator variables. The findings suggest that auditors who experience 
client intimidation in an audit conflict situation are more likely to have their independence impaired 
than those who are in a similar situation but without client intimidation. Moreover, auditors who 
experience client intimidation perceive higher pressure than those who do not experience intimidation. 
Finally, auditors’ affective and continuance professional commitment dimensions moderate the 
relationship between auditors’ perceived pressures and auditor independence. 
The aim of the fourth essay is twofold. First, it aims to develop a scale for measuring 
auditors’ reputation awareness. Second, it aims to examine the correlation between the levels of 
auditor reputation awareness and auditor independence. A seven-item scale was developed as the 
reputation awareness scale. The findings indicate that the scale consists of one dimension. It also has a
level of satisfactory reliability and a high level of validity. The findings show that there is a positive 
correlation between the level of auditors’ reputation awareness and auditor independence.
Keywords: Auditing, Auditor, Auditor independence, Threats to auditor independence, Social 
pressures, Professional commitment, Locus of control, Awareness
 
 
 
Sammanfattning
Revisorns oberoende är en hörnsten i revisorsyrket och den grundläggande princip som styrker 
revisorsyrkets anseende i offentlighetens ljus. Det är faktiskt den egenskap som allmänheten 
efterfrågar mest hos revisorer. Därför beror revisorsyrkets hållbarhet på hur revisorer kan skydda 
denna princip. Denna avhandling består av fyra essäer som hänger samman med varandra och har att 
göra med revisorns oberoende. Mer specifikt undersöker den situationer som kan hota och minska 
revisorns oberoende. Dessutom undersöker denna avhandling också flera variabler som kan öka och 
skydda revisorns oberoende.
Den första essän syftar till att undersöka inverkan av sociala påtryckningar på revisorers 
bedömning vilka förekommer inom revisorsbyråer inom ramen för ett samhälle med de kulturella 
dimensionerna ”hög maktdistans” och ”låg individualism”. De sociala påtryckningarna bestod av 
lydnadspåtryckning utövad av en överordnad till revisorn och likformighetspåtryckning utövad av en 
kollega till revisorn. Vidare inkluderades två modererande variabler – en flerdimensionell yrkesmässig 
förpliktelse och kontrollokus – i förhållandet mellan de sociala påtryckningarna som revisorer möter 
och revisorernas bedömning. Resultaten visar att lydnads- och likformighetspåtryckningar inverkar på 
revisorns bedömning. Revisorer som möter de sociala påtryckningarna kommer att göra en bedömning 
som till och med kan vara diametralt motsatt till oberoendeprincipen. Resultaten tyder även på att en 
flerdimensionell yrkesmässig förpliktelse och kontrollokus potentiellt kan inverka på revisorns 
bedömning i en situation med sociala påtryckningar.
Den andra essän syftar till att utforska sambandet mellan försvars- och förtrolighetshot
förorsakade av revisionsavgiftsberoende samt revisorns ämbetstid och revisorns oberoende baserat på 
finländsk data, lag och revisionsförhållanden. Denna essä motiverades av pappret the Green Paper on 
Audit Policy, publicerat av Europeiska kommissionen år 2010, i vilket man bland annat frågar sig om 
den maximala avgiften som kan uppbäras av en klient borde regleras och om på varandra följande 
uppdrag borde begränsas. I motsats till allmän övertygelse, finner denna essä inga bevis för att 
revisionsavgifter och en långvarig ämbetstid som revisor kommer att äventyra revisorns oberoende.
Därför stödjer inte resultaten handlingsprogram för att reglera revisorsavgifter eller begränsa revisorns 
ämbetstid i Finland. 
Den tredje essän syftar till att undersöka effekten av hotelser från klienten på revisorns 
oberoende i en revisor-klient-konfliktsituation. Faran för hotelser är en av fem faror gällande 
oberoende som uttryckligen hänvisas till i IFACs ramverk för oberoende. Hotelser från klienten 
manifesterades i att klienten hotade att byta ut revisorn, om revisorn inte antog klientens ståndpunkt.
Dessutom undersöker denna essä den roll som revisorns upplevda påtryckningar och en 
flerdimensionell yrkesmässig förpliktelse har som modererande variabler. Resultaten talar för att det är 
mer sannolikt att revisorer som upplever hotelser från klienten i en revisionskonfliktsituation blir 
mindre oberoende än de som är i en liknande situation, men utan hotelser från klienten. Vidare 
uppfattar revisorer som upplever hotelser från klienten mer påtryckning än de som inte upplever 
hotelser. Slutligen modererar dimensionerna gällande revisorns affektiva och varaktiga yrkesmässiga 
förpliktelse förhållandet mellan revisorns uppfattade påtryckningar och revisorns oberoende. 
Syftet med den fjärde essän är tvåfaldigt. För det första syftar den till att utarbeta en skala för att 
mäta revisorers ryktesmedvetenhet. För det andra syftar den till att undersöka korrelationen mellan 
nivåerna på revisorns ryktesmedvetenhet och revisorns oberoende. En sjupunktsskala utarbetades som
skalan för ryktesmedvetenhet. Resultaten tyder på att skalan består av en dimension. Den har också en 
nöjaktig reliabilitetsnivå och en hög validitetsnivå. Resultaten visar att det finns en positiv korrelation 
mellan nivån på revisorers ryktesmedvetenhet och revisorers oberoende. 
Nyckelord: revision, revisor, revisorns oberoende, faror gällande/hot mot revisorns oberoende, sociala 
påtryckningar, yrkesmässig förpliktelse, kontrollokus, medvetenhet 
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I. The impact of social pressures, locus of control, and professional commitment on auditors’ 
judgment: Indonesian evidence, 2012, Asian Review of Accounting, 20 (2), 163-178 (co-author: 
Ralf Östermark). 
 
II. Auditor fee dependence, auditor tenure, and auditor independence: The case of Finland, 
2013. Forthcoming in International Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Performance 
Evaluation (co-author: Ralf Östermark). 
 
III. The effect of client intimidation on auditor independence in an audit conflict situation, 
presented at Nordic Accounting Conference 2012, Copenhagen (co-author: Ralf Östermark). 
 
IV. Auditors’ reputation awareness and independence, manuscript (co-author: Ralf Östermark). 
 
 1 INTRODUCTION
 
1.1 Background
The auditing profession performs a role in giving reasonable assurance to the public and users’ of 
financial statements, specifically investors and creditors, of the reliability and credibility of a firms’ 
financial statements. To fulfil this role, there are several principles that auditors should espouse. One 
of the most important principles is independence. By demonstrating their independence, auditors’ 
opinions on financial statements will be valued by the users. 
In essence, auditor independence refers to an absence of interest by the auditor in the auditing
assignment, thereby avoiding material bias that could affect the reliability and credibility of the 
financial statements. The auditing profession promotes the principle of independence to define, 
defend, and extend the profession (Sikka and Willmott, 1995). It is widely accepted that independence 
is the most priceless asset in the auditing profession and the basic principle that underpins the
reputation of the auditing profession in the public eye. By conducting an auditing work independently,
auditors protect the public’s confidence in such services. In fact, the viability of the profession 
depends on how it can ensure adherence to the principle of independence. 
Despite this, several firms’ scandals, directly or indirectly involving auditors, have damaged 
public confidence in auditor independence. These scandals have taken place not just in one country 
but across the world: HIH Insurance (March, 2001) and One.Tel (July, 2001) in Australia; Enron 
(October, 2001), Hewlett-Packard
Although these scandals cannot solely be attributed to the failures of the auditors, the public 
perceived that a large part of the responsibility lay with them. This is because the public expects the 
auditing profession to perform not just as watchdogs that give them reasonable assurance but also as 
bloodhounds that track out everything even when there is nothing to provoke auditors’ suspicion.
Moreover, it is also widely believed that these scandals took place because of the auditors’ lack of 
independence, as a result of accommodating their clients’ interests during audits.
(2012), and WorldCom (June, 2002) in the US; Vivendi (July, 2002) 
in France; Ahold (February, 2003) in the Netherlands; Parmalat (February, 2003) in Italy; and Kanebo 
(2006) and Olympus (2011) in Japan, among others. These scandals have caused the public suffering
huge losses and have also damaged the reputation of the auditors and the auditing profession. In fact,
the Enron failure led to the collapse of the Arthur Andersen audit firm, which at the time was one of 
the Big Five audit firms.
The literature shows that there are several situations that can potentially threaten auditor 
independence. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) (2012) reveals five threats to 
auditor independence: self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity, and intimidation.
Furthermore, based on their survey of practicing auditors in the US and Australia, Umar and 
Anandarajan (2004) found that there are two pressures that may impair auditor independence: the 
pressure to retain the client and the pressure to conform. The former is caused by the need for
sustainable revenue for the audit firm and the need to retain the client for future auditing assignments. 
The latter, on the other hand, is a result of superiors asking the auditors to take certain actions. In 
addition, Lord and DeZoort (2001) maintain that social pressures were comprised of obedience 
pressure exerted by auditors’ superiors and conformity pressure exerted by auditors’ colleagues can 
impair auditor independence. These pressures can impair auditor independence since auditors are 
motivated to protect their careers (obedience pressure) and to avoid feeling uncomfortable or not 
being considered as a peer’s member because of a disagreement with their peers (conformity pressure).
The numerous scandals mentioned above not only damaged the reputation of the audit firms
directly involved, but also the auditing profession as a whole. The adagium that the actions of a few 
bad “apples” can be devastating to the entire profession is valid in this case (Cravens and Oliver, 
2006). The action of a few bad audit firms could endanger the viability of the auditing profession. 
Members of the auditing profession should be aware of the importance of independence and to avoid 
these types of scandals in future.
 
1.2 Purpose of Dissertation
This dissertation aims to contribute both theoretically to the literature, and practically to the auditing 
profession, through four interrelated essays. All four essays are concerned with auditor independence. 
1
 In particular, three of the essays investigate situations that potentially create threats that could impair 
auditor independence, including social pressures, self-interest, familiarity, and intimidation. 
Additionally, a recent essay developed an auditor reputation awareness scale and explored the 
possibility of relationship between the levels of auditors’ reputation awareness and their independence.
The research questions in this dissertation were as follows: Would social pressures impair auditor 
independence in the setting of the “high power distance” and “collectivist” cultural dimensions? Is 
auditor independence impaired by a threat to self-interest caused by an auditor’s fee dependence to 
clients and a familiarity threat caused by long tenure? Is auditor independence impaired by an 
intimidation threat caused by a client’s threat to replace the auditor? Does a high level of auditor 
reputation awareness protect auditor independence, especially when facing client intimidation?
 
1.3 Contribution and Structure of Dissertation
The interrelated essays in this dissertation aim to contribute to the extant literature on auditor 
independence by increasing the understanding of situations that potentially threaten auditor 
independence. In addition, this dissertation offers factors that may theoretically and practically 
enhance and protect auditor independence.
The first essay contributes to the literature on auditor independence by examining the effect of 
social pressures on auditor independence. In contrast to the many studies on the pressures experienced 
by auditors from parties outside of audit firms, only a few studies concerned with the pressures 
experienced by auditors from within an audit firm. The social pressures within an audit firm consist of 
obedience pressure exerted by auditors’ superiors (i.e., managers or partners) and conformity pressure 
exerted by colleagues or peers. Moreover, two individual variables were also examined as moderating 
variables in the relationship between social pressures and auditor independence: multi-dimensions of 
professional commitment and locus of control. In contrast to prior research (Lord and DeZoort, 2001),
this essay considered the cultural dimensions of auditors in the analysis. The data was collected from 
auditors in a country that has “high power distance” and “low individualism” cultural dimensions
(Hofstede, 1998). This essay argues that specific cultural dimensions make auditors more vulnerable 
to the impairment of their independence when experiencing social pressures.
The second essay contributes to the literature on auditor independence by examining the 
effect of a self-interest threat caused by an auditor’s economic dependence on a client and a 
familiarity threat caused by an auditor’s long tenure with the same client. The literature shows that 
there are competing theoretical arguments and inconclusive empirical evidence regarding the 
association between these two threats and auditor independence. This essay was prompted by a green 
paper on audit policy published by the European Commission (2010), which considered several 
threats that could jeopardise auditor independence, including the two mentioned above. This essay
examines the effect of economic dependence and tenure on the basis of Finnish data, law, and 
auditing settings, which are characterised by aspects such as legal tradition in a code-law country, 
lower external investor rights, higher legal enforcement, middle importance of equity market, higher 
level of ownership concentration, and lower litigation risk for auditors. Besides contributing to the 
literature, the analysis also provides regulators with empirical evidence that the highest bracket of fees 
that a client pays the auditor does not need to be regulated and that auditor tenure does not need to be 
limited in Finland.
The third essay contributes to the literature on auditor independence by examining the effect of 
an intimidation threat by a client on auditor independence in an audit conflict situation. An audit 
conflict situation arises when there is a disagreement between the client and the auditor over certain 
accounting issues. Intimidation threat is one of five independence threats that are explicitly referenced 
in the independence framework (IFAC, 2012). Although this threat is considered the worst, 
surprisingly, this is the threat for which the auditor independence framework offers the least amount 
of prohibition and safeguard (Fearnley, Beattie, and Richard, 2005). Moreover, while prior studies 
have examined the impact of conflict on auditor independence and found important evidence to this 
effect, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that directly examine the impact of client 
pressures (i.e., explicit client intimidation to replace the auditor) on auditor independence in an audit 
conflict situation. Hence, this essay is the first attempt to investigate such a situation. In addition, this 
essay empirically tests a general model of pressures developed by DeZoort and Lord (1997) by 
2
 examining the effects of an auditors’ perceived pressure variable in the relationship between client 
intimidation and auditor independence.
The final essay in this dissertation contributes to the literature on auditor independence by 
developing a reputation of independence-awareness scale for auditors and exploring the correlation
between the auditors’ reputation awareness and independence. While the literature has placed great 
emphasis on the importance of a reputation of independence, this has been at the audit firm level 
instead of the auditing profession as a whole. Moreover, the psychology literature shows that an 
individual’s awareness of an issue can increase the probability that the individual will pay more 
attention to related information and take it into account when making decisions. This increased 
attention will subsequently affect how the individual will behave when facing situations related to the 
issue. 
The remainder of this introductory section comprises 4 sections. The next section briefly 
describes the theoretical background concepts employed in the essays such as demand for auditing, 
auditor independence, and threats to auditor independence; this is followed by a summary of the 
essays. The general conclusions are then presented, and the final section contains the original essays.
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 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
 
2.1 Demand for Auditing
Management is responsible for allocating a firm’s resources efficiently and effectively as well as 
operating the firm on behalf of the principals (i.e., shareholders). In terms of this responsibility, 
management has to report and disclose to the principals information about the firm’s conditions, 
including its past performance, the current condition, and future prospects (Wallin, 1992). All of this 
information is captured in the financial statements. Therefore, the financial statements will be used by 
the principals and other related-parties as a basis for evaluating the management’s performance and
the firm’s conditions, and also for making sound decisions regarding investments and lending, among 
other things. However, information contained in the financial statements may be biased and unreliable 
for several reasons (Arens, Elder, and Beasley, 2012; Rittenberg, Schwieger, and Johnstone, 2008):
1) Remoteness of information: A modern firm separates between ownership and management. In this
situation, most shareholders as well as other users of the firm’s financial statements, cannot 
interact directly and get first-hand knowledge about the firm from the management. They also 
cannot monitor or control the firm’s reporting process. In addition, they face difficulties in directly 
interviewing management, inspecting the firm’s plants, and reviewing the firm’s accounting 
records. Such remoteness of information may increase the probability of intentionally or 
unintentionally misstated financial statements.
2) Biases and motives of the management: The management has their own interests in providing 
information to shareholders and users of financial statements. It also has inside information that 
they may or may not choose to share. Since information contained in the financial statements is 
controlled by the management, it is possible that they may try to bias the information in their 
favour. A conflict of interest and incentive between the management and shareholders and the 
other users could result in bias in the financial statements.
3) Voluminous data: As firms grow larger, the volume of their transactions also increases. This 
increases the probability that transactions will be recorded improperly and included in the records 
either intentionally or unintentionally.
4) Complex exchange transactions: Over the past few decades, transactions between firms have 
become more complex. Consequently, it becomes more difficult to record these transactions 
properly.
For these reasons, the principals and users of financial statements need assurance regarding the 
reliability and credibility of financial statements. They need an independent agent that they can rely 
on for this information, and an auditor plays the role of such an agent.
In addition, in an era in which the capital market plays an important part in the economy, 
auditors provide two critical roles to capital market participants (Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller, 2004): 
an information role and an insurance role. As an information role, auditors provide independent 
verification of the information contained in the financial statements. By doing so, auditors increase 
the reliability and credibility of the financial statements. For the insurance role, auditors, either jointly 
or separately from management, provide capital market participants with indemnity insurance that 
covers potential losses. This is because, in many countries, a Corporate Act gives the public the right 
to sue auditors in case of flawed financial statements.
2.2 Auditor Independence
As mentioned above, independence is the attribute most demanded from auditors by shareholders and 
other users of financial statements (i.e., the public) when an audit is being conducted. By acting 
independently, auditors can validate and assure the public of the credibility and reliability of the 
audited financial statements. If this principle is not maintained, the auditors’ opinions on the financial 
statements will be of no value (Firth, 1980). Therefore, independence is a cornerstone of the viability 
of each auditor as well as the auditing profession as a whole. It is also the most priceless asset of the 
auditing profession (Melancon, 2002). The auditing profession promotes the principle of 
independence as part of its image in order to define, defend, and promote the profession (Sikka and 
Willmott, 1995). Indeed, independence has become the maxim of the auditing profession (Barlett, 
1991).
4
 There are various definitions of auditor independence in the literature. Academics, regulatory, 
and professional bodies are still at odds in identifying an authoritative definition. The International 
Federation of Accountants (2012) divided independence into two dimensions: independence in mind 
and independence in appearance. The former is defined as “the state of mind that permits the 
expression of a conclusion without being affected by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity and exercise objectivity and 
professional scepticism.” (p. 46)
On the other hand, independence in appearance is defined as “the avoidance of facts and 
circumstances that are so significant that a reasonable and informed third party would be likely to 
conclude, weighing all the specific facts and circumstances, that a firm’s, or a member of the audit 
team’s, integrity, objectivity or professional scepticism has been compromised” (p. 46).
Barlett (1991) described independence in fact as a characteristic of the individual auditor in
which auditors will be unbiased when conducting the auditing assignment, from the planning phase 
through to the reporting phase. He describes independence in appearance as a set of constraints on the 
behaviour of auditors that creates the appearance of not having a vested interest in the auditing 
outcome. In their seminal book, Mautz and Sharaf (1980) referred to these two dimensions of auditor 
independence as practitioner-independence and profession-independence, respectively. 
Academics have several definitions of auditor independence. For instance, Knapp (1985) 
defines independence as “the ability of auditors to resist management pressure” (p. 203). Meanwhile, 
McKinley, Pany, and Reckners (1985) define independence as the “[ability] to act with integrity and
objectivity in performing the audit” (p. 892). Bartlett (1993) defines independence as “an unbiased 
mental attitude in making decisions about audit work and financial reporting” (p. 55). Additionally, 
Younkins (1996) cited by Nouri and Lombardi (2009) defines independence as “freedom from the 
control of those whose records are being reviewed” (p. 1).
Overall, auditor independence is the most demanded principle by the public. In essence, 
auditor independence means that auditors will keep themselves impartial and free from bias and 
vested interests. Auditor independence will give the public confidence in the opinions offered 
regarding a firm’s financial statements. Therefore, it will increase the reliability and credibility of the 
firm’s financial statements, and shareholders as well as other users can rely on these statements to 
make sound decisions about investments and lending, among other things.
2.3 Proxies of Auditor Independence
The literature shows that there are several proxies employed to measure auditor independence. 
Commonly, the proxies employed by the researchers determined by the type of research method or 
approach that they apply. Table 2.1 presents summary of the proxies of auditor independence.
Table 2.1: Proxies of Auditor Independence
Proxies Literature
Auditors’ propensity to issue going 
concern opinion
Lennox (1999); DeFond et al. (2002); Craswell, Stokes, 
and Laughton (2002); Dahlia (2008); Li (2009); Ruiz-
Barbadillo, Gomez-Aguilar, and Carrera (2009); Hope and 
Langli (2010), Ye, Carson, and Simnett (2011)
Earnings restatements Raghunandan et al. (2001); Bloomfield and Shackman 
(2008); Paterson and Valencia (2011); Schmidt (2012)
Abnormal accruals DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994); Becker et al.(1998); 
Francis et al. (1999); Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002); 
Gul, Chen, and Tsui (2003); Krishnan (2003); Ashbaugh, 
LaFond, and Mayhew (2003); Chung and Kallapur (2003); 
Reynold et al. (2004); Gul et al. (2007); Chen, Lin, and 
Lin (2008)
Earnings benchmark Frankel et al. (2002); Ashbaugh et al. (2003)
Auditors’ judgment Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995); Goodwin and Trotman 
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 (1995); Lord and DeZoort (2001): Haynes, Jenkins, and 
Nutt (1998); Patel, Harisson, and McKinnon (2002); Gul, 
Ng, and Tong (2003), Moreno and Bhattacharjee (2003); 
Bamber and Iyer (2007); Cianci and Bierstaker (2009); 
Martinov-Bennie and Pflugrath (2009); Hatfield, Jackson, 
and Vandervelde (2011); Peytcheva and Gillett (2011); 
Paino, Smith, and Ismail (2012)
Users’ perception Firth (1980); Shockley (1981); Knapp (1985); McKinley, 
Pany, and Reckers (1985); Gul (1989); Gul (1991); 
Hussey and Lan (2001); Iyer and Rama (2004); Brandon 
and Mueller (2006), Dart (2011)
This dissertation employed two of the proxies above: absolute discretionary accruals in the second 
essay and auditors’ judgments in the first, third, and the fourth essay. The first proxy is employed by a 
reason that higher absolute discretionary accruals are consistent with the conclusion that auditors 
allow the clients to exercise a greater accounting flexibility to conceal poor performance or save 
current earnings for future use (Krishnan, 2003). Therefore, the higher absolute discretionary accruals 
the more auditor independence is impaired.
The second proxy is employed widely in the literature applying an experimental or a survey 
method. Commonly, the auditors who participate as the subjects or the participants will be presented 
with an auditing case. In the end of that case, the participants will be asked to make judgments
regarding the presented case. Prior studies usually asked the participants to respond in probability or 
likelihood estimation forms. However, borrowing Solomon’s (1994) argument, using these response 
forms will produce a mixed response variable and it is not clear what can reliably be discerned from 
such measures.  This dissertation presented the participants with an auditing case regarding 
questioned equipment found by the auditors in an auditing work. The pressures were included and 
manipulated in that case according to the aim of each paper. In the end of that case, the participants 
were asked to determine the value of the net equipment account balance that they will sign off on. The 
higher the amount of the net equipment balance signed off by the auditors, the lower their 
independence.
2.4 Threats to Auditor Independence
A series of corporate scandals recently occurred that unfortunately, to some extent, involved auditors. 
The public commonly attributed these scandals to lack of auditor independence. Accordingly, the 
literature shows that certain situations can create threats to auditor independence. IFAC (2012) 
discussed that threats to auditor independence can fall into several categories. Three of such threats,
directly related to this dissertation, are briefly described as follows:
1. Self-interest threat: This refers to a threat caused by a financial or other self-interest conflict, 
including a direct or indirect financial interest in the client, dependence on the client’s audit or 
non-audit fees, and motivation to retain the client. The auditor fee dependence is one factor that 
Beattie, Brandt, and Fearnley (1999) suggest could impair auditor independence. Logically
speaking, in order to ensure their future revenues, auditors will try to retain their clients. Intuitively, 
the higher the revenue, the more dependent will the auditors be on the clients, and the more likely 
will be the need to retain them. To retain these clients, the auditors will be reluctant to take actions
that would adversely affect the client’s interest, even if this means sacrificing their own 
independence. Accordingly, DeAngelo (1981) argues that a greater shared economic interest 
between the auditor and the client decreases auditor independence. Several studies have examined 
the association between the auditor fee dependence and auditor independence; however, the 
evidence about such association is mixed (e.g., Gul, Chen, and Tsui, 2003; Frankel, Johnson, and 
Nelson, 2002; Hoitash, Markelevich, and Barragato, 2007; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003;
Hope and Langli, 2010).
2. Advocacy and Familiarity threat: This refers to a threat mainly caused by long-term consecutive 
auditing assignments, namely, auditor tenure, with the same client. According to Davis, Soo, and 
Trompeter (2003) the longer the auditors conduct auditing for the same clients, the more may 
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 auditor independence be impaired. The impairment of auditor independence due to long tenure is 
based on the following reasons:
a. Over time, an auditor is more likely to identify and act as the management’s advocate for the 
client’s position rather than as an external auditor required to maintain a sceptical perspective.
As an advocate, the auditor will adopt a position that closely aligns with management.
b. Over time, an auditor will experience a belief perseverance syndrome, that is, a tendency to 
cling to one's initial belief even after receiving new information that contradicts or disconfirms 
the basis of that belief (Anderson, 2007). In such a case, an auditor fails to revise the 
appropriateness of management’s assertions even though the facts and conditions have changed.
c. An auditor will try to retain a client over the long term assignment to cover the auditor’s start-
up costs incurred during the first-year assignment. As a result, the auditor may become lenient 
with the client. Moreover, DeAngelo (1981) suggests that “client-specific rent,” which the 
auditor can extract only over time, may create an economic dependence and possibly impair 
auditor independence.
3. Intimidation threat: This refers to a threat caused by intimidation, commonly arising from 
management, whether actual or perceived, that may deter auditors from acting independently and 
exercising their professional scepticism (IFAC, 2012). A common form of an intimidation threat is 
the threat of replacement. Auditors are commonly in a weak position because of an asymmetrical 
power relationship, or an imbalance of power that exists between auditors and their clients
(Goldman and Barlev, 1974). This is normal given the nature of the auditing process, in which the
client selects the auditor, determines the scope of the audit, and terminates or replaces the auditor. 
Moreover, the client also provides the auditor with the facilities and information needed to perform 
the audit. Even in a situation where the auditor is selected by an audit committee, there is no
specific enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the client does not become involved, directly or 
indirectly, in selecting the auditor or determining the audit fee and the scope of the audit (Windsor, 
2005; Baker, 2005). Consequently, auditors are vulnerable to intimidation by clients in a conflict 
situation, where a disagreement occurs between the client and the auditor over certain accounting 
issues, including the need to make adjustments to the financial statements, the appropriateness of 
the accounting principles applied by the client, or the adequacy of financial statement disclosures 
(Knapp, 1985). In addition to this asymmetrical power situation, the auditor position is impacted
by their motivation to retain their clients for future auditing assignments to ensure future revenues.
 
2.5 Social Pressures
Besides the situations discussed above, there are additional situations emerging within the audit firms 
that can impair auditor independence, for example, social pressures. There are two types of social 
pressures: obedience pressure and conformity pressure. Obedience pressure is exerted by an
individual with authority in a hierarchical context, namely, a superior (Milgram, 1974). An authority 
figure can shape subordinates’ actions through specific commands. These subordinates may feel 
relatively unconcerned about carrying out such actions, even if these actions contradict their personal 
beliefs and principles, when they were commanded by an authority to do so. A seminal experimental 
study conducted by Milgram (1974) showed that under obedience pressure, an individual would even 
be willing to act in an unethical manner. This is due to a lack of perceived responsibility. The 
individual feels responsible to the authority but not responsible for the action that the authority 
commands. Indeed, the individual will accept the authority’s definition of the ethics of the action (i.e., 
in terms of right or wrong). In an audit firm, managers and partners are the authority figures. An
auditor will obey their superiors’ commands or suggestions, not only to avoid punishment or to 
achieve rewards but also to preserve their careers.
Conformity pressure is pressure exerted by colleagues or a peer group. In this case, an
individual is under pressure to conform to the beliefs, actions, and attitudes of their peer group.
Although obedience and conformity pressures are exerted by external sources, these are different in 
the following ways (Milgram, 1974):
(1) Hierarchy: obedience pressure occurs within a hierarchical structure in the organisation; 
meanwhile, conformity pressure occurs among those of equal status;
(2) Imitation: conformity is an imitation of one’s peers’ behaviours whereas obedience is not;
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 (3) Explicitness: in obedience pressure, the prescription for some behaviour is commonly explicit. In 
conformity pressure, it often remains implicit; 
(4) Voluntarism: in conformity, individuals use voluntarism to explain their behaviour.
The main reason why an individual conforms to a peer is a desire to gain recognition as a member of 
the peer group, which leads to the situation in which they begin to lack independence. This is known 
as the situation of uncritical acceptance of group ideas and evaluations (Asch, 1956). Asch (1956) 
investigated how an individual will behave during a disagreement with the peer group about a clear 
and simple issue of fact. The study was designed such that the group reported incorrect judgments 
while the individual could only judge the facts correctly. The findings showed that some subjects 
experienced a lack of independence with their judgments being influenced by the group’s judgments. 
Both obedience and conformity pressures can impair auditor independence when the commands
or suggestions of the auditors’ superiors or colleagues contradict the independence principle. However, 
the findings of Lord and DeZoort (2001) only confirmed the former in the auditing context. It is 
possible that other variables (e.g., cultural dimensions) play a significant role in the context of social 
pressures. 
Hofstede (1998) identified five cultural dimensions that are distinguished among nations. It 
seems that two of them relate to how auditors would respond to social pressures, namely power 
distance and individualism/collectivism. Hofstede (1980) (cited in Smith and Hume, 2005) defined
power distance as a degree of a society’s tolerance and preference for unequal hierarchical power on 
the job.  Meanwhile, individualism is a degree of relative importance that societal members place 
upon their own views and welfare. It is possible that society members in nations with high power 
distance are more vulnerable to obedience pressure compared with others from low power distance 
nations. Moreover, society members in nations with low individualism are more vulnerable to 
conformity pressure compared with others from high individualism nations.
2.6 Factors Enhancing Auditor Independence
2.6.1 Auditors’ reputation of independence awareness.
The literature shows that awareness influences the manner in which individuals act and behave in 
certain situations. For example, Butterfield, Trevino, and Weaver (2000) emphasised the significant 
role of (moral) awareness as a critical step affecting how an individual behaves. They stated that 
without (moral) awareness, individuals cannot identify the (moral) issue when facing it in certain 
situations, rendering them unable to factor it into the decision-making process. Additionally, Mautz 
and Sharaf (1986) also stated that when auditors are aware of the nature of independence, they take 
the necessary precautions to maintain this independence. Hence, awareness of the importance of 
independence in the auditing profession could prevent auditors from engaging in behaviours that 
damage this reputation.
 
2.6.2 Perceived pressure
DeZoort and Lord (1997) developed a general pressure model in accounting. There are three variables 
in their model. One of these variables is auditors’ stress response, which refers to how auditors 
perceive an individual pressure at a specific point in time as well as the cumulative effects of pressure 
over time. They proposed that auditors’ stress response would influence their behaviours and
judgments when they experience certain pressure situations. Until now, there has been no research 
that attempted to examine this variable empirically.
 
2.6.3 Professional commitment
Aranya, Pollock, and Amernic (1981) stated that the concept of professional commitment (PC) has 
been a concern for both accounting researchers and practitioners because of its consequences. PC is 
defined as “the relative strength of identification with and involvement in a particular profession, as 
well as the willingness to exert effort on behalf of the profession and the desire to maintain 
membership in it” (Aranya and Ferris, 1984, p. 3). Meyer and Allen (1991) developed a concept of 
multiple dimensions of organisational commitment, which was adapted by Hall, Smith, and 
Langfield-Smith (2005) as multiple dimensions of PC. The dimensions are Affective PC (APC), 
Continuance PC (CPC), and Normative PC (NPC). APC refers to the extent to which individuals 
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 "want to stay” in the profession because they identify themselves with the goals of the profession and 
want to contribute to the achievement of those goals. CPC refers to the extent to which individuals 
feel they “have to stay” in the profession because of the accumulated investment that they have made 
(e.g., in study effort, training, etc.) and also because of the lack of other alternatives. Finally, NPC 
refers to the extent to which individuals feel they “ought to stay” in the profession as an obligation. It 
is argued that the levels of an individual’s multiple dimensions of PC are a strong predictor of 
turnover intention, job satisfaction, work behaviours, as well as judgment, among other things.
 
2.6.4 Locus of Control
Locus of control (LOC) is one of the most studied variables both in psychology and other social 
sciences (Rotter, 1990), including accounting research (e.g., Singer and Singer, 1985; Tsui and Gul, 
1996; Hyatt and Prawitt, 2001; Patten, 2005). LOC refers to the extent to which individuals believe
that reinforcement or an outcome of their behaviour is contingent on their own behaviour or personal 
characteristics (namely, internal LOC); or is a function of chance, luck, fate, under others’ control, or 
simply unpredictable (namely, external LOC). These beliefs will significantly influence individuals’ 
behaviour. For instance, individuals that have external LOC tend to be less responsible for the 
consequences of their behaviour and will blame these on external factors. Hence, LOC is a good 
predictor of an individual’s behaviour.
Based on the theoretical background described above, the conceptual model of the hypotheses 
developed in this dissertation can be summarised in Figure 2.1.
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 Social Pressures: 
? Obedience pressure 
? Conformity pressure 
Self-interest threat: 
? Economic 
dependence 
Advocacy and Familiarity 
threat: 
? Auditor tenure 
Intimidation threat: 
? Client intimidation 
 
Auditor 
independence 
Locus of 
control 
Professional 
commitment 
Awareness 
on reputation 
Perceived 
pressure 
Figure 2.1: The Conceptual Model 
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 3 SUMMARY OF THE ESSAYS
 
3.1 Essay 1:
The first essay aims to examine the impact of social pressures occurring within audit firms on auditors’ 
judgment. Pressures exerted by external parties or external audit firms have received extensive 
attention; however, only a few attempts have been made to examine pressures arising from within 
audit firms. Pressures from within audit firms are comprised of obedience pressure exerted by an 
auditor’s superior (i.e., a manager or partner) and conformity pressure exerted by an auditor’s
colleague or peer. These pressures were examined by Lord and DeZoort (2001) in the US context.
However, they failed to find evidence supporting the hypothesis that conformity pressure influences
auditors’ judgment. This essay argues that cultural dimensions should be taken into account. 
Moreover, since auditing in terms of public accountants or auditors is a worldwide profession, it is 
important to understand the impact of cultural dimensions on how auditors behave and make 
judgments under certain situations. This essay examines the impact of social pressures in the setting 
of a society with the “high power distance” and “low individualism” cultural dimensions. This essay
argues that these dimensions would intensify the impact of obedience and conformity pressures on 
auditor judgment.
The impact of social pressures, locus of control, and professional 
commitment on auditors’ judgment: Indonesian evidence
This essay employs a between-subjects experimental design, with 70 auditors who work for Big 
Four and non-Big Four audit firms in Indonesia as the subjects. The independent variables of
obedience and conformity pressures were manipulated through an auditing case that was initially 
developed by Lord and DeZoort (2001). A few modifications were made in adapting the case to the 
aim of this essay. Moreover, two moderating variables—a multi-dimensional professional 
commitment and locus of control—were included to predict factors that could influence auditors’ 
judgment when they experience social pressures.
The findings suggest that both obedience and conformity pressures influence auditor judgment. 
These findings are partly consistent with Lord and DeZoort (2001), particularly in relation to the 
impact of obedience pressure on auditor judgment. However, the difference is that the analysis in this 
essay supports the hypothesis that conformity pressure also influences auditor judgment. Hence, these 
findings support the argument that social pressures will influence how auditors behave and make 
judgments and that some specific cultural dimensions intensify these pressures. Moreover, the 
findings indicate that a multi-dimensional professional commitment and locus of control may 
potentially influence auditor judgment in a situation with social pressures.
  
3.2 Essay 2: Auditor fee dependence, auditor tenure, and auditor independence: 
The case of Finland.
The second essay aims to investigate the association of advocacy and familiarity threats caused by 
auditor fee dependence and auditor tenure on auditor independence based on Finnish data, law, and 
auditing environment. This essay was motivated by the Green Paper on Audit Policy, published by the 
European Commission in 2010. The green paper questions whether the maximum fee collected from a 
client should be regulated and whether consecutive assignments should be limited, among others. In 
addition, the literature shows that there are competing theoretical arguments and inconclusive 
empirical evidence regarding association of these two questions and their impact on auditor 
independence.
This essay employs audit, non-audit, total fees, and client importance as proxies of auditor fee 
dependence. Moreover, auditor tenure is divided into short (that is, one, less than two, and less than 
three years) and long tenures (that is, equal to or more than three years). Auditor independence is 
proxied by absolute discretionary accruals. Higher absolute discretionary accruals indicate impaired 
auditor independence because auditors allowed clients to exercise a greater accounting flexibility to 
conceal poor performance or save current earnings for future use (Krishnan, 2003). An archival 
approach was employed to test the hypotheses. The population of interest comprised Finnish firms 
listed on the Helsinki NASDAQ OMX Stock Exchange with account closings on December 31, 2007 
and 2008.
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 The findings can be summarised as follows. First, auditor fee dependence on a client is not 
associated with absolute discretionary accruals. Second, short auditor tenure is positively associated 
with absolute discretionary accruals; however, only a one-year tenure is statistically significant. Third, 
long auditor tenure is negatively associated with absolute discretionary accruals. Taken together, these 
results do not support policies to regulate auditor fees or limit auditor tenure in Finland.
 
3.3 Essay 3: The effect of client intimidation on auditor independence in an 
audit conflict situation
The third essay aims to examine the effect of client intimidation on auditor independence in an audit-
client conflict situation (that is, a disagreement between auditors and clients over certain accounting 
issues). The audit-client conflict situation in this essay relates to an auditor’s proposal to write off the 
equipment in question in the auditing work. On the other hand, the client suggested keeping the 
equipment according to the recorded balance and depreciating it for five years. Client intimidation 
was manifested in the client threatening to replace the auditor if the auditor did not adopt the client’s
position. This essay also attempts to empirically test a general pressure model developed by DeZoort 
and Lord (1997) by investigating the impact of auditors’ perceived pressure on auditor independence 
and exploring the moderating/interacting role of auditors’ professional commitment dimensions in the 
relationship between auditors’ perceived pressures and their independence.
An instrument-based case was administered to 119 auditors from national auditing firms in 
Indonesia. This essay argues that these audit firms are more suitable for testing this essay’s 
hypotheses because they face greater competition to win and retain a client as opposed to the Big Four 
audit firms. The subjects were divided into two groups: those facing intimidation and those without 
client intimidation in an audit conflict situation. Auditor independence is measured through the net 
equipment account balance signed off by the auditors on the equipment in question. The higher the net 
equipment account balance signed off on by the auditor, the more likely it is that auditor 
independence is impaired.
The findings can be summarised as follows. First, auditors who experience client intimidation 
in an audit conflict situation are more likely to have their independence impaired than those who are 
in a similar situation but without client intimidation. Second, auditors who experience client 
intimidation perceive higher pressure than those who do not experience intimidation. Third, auditors’ 
affective and continuance professional commitment dimensions moderate the relationship between 
auditors’ perceived pressures and auditor independence. 
 
3.4 Essay 4: Auditors’ reputation awareness and independence
The aim of the fourth essay is twofold. First, it aims to develop a scale for measuring auditors’
reputation awareness. This essay argues that auditors’ awareness of their reputation of independence 
is important for the sustainability of the auditing profession. Auditor reputation awareness is defined 
as the degree to which auditors recognise the importance of the auditing profession’s reputation and 
acknowledge the impact of their decisions or actions on the profession’s reputation. Second, this essay
examines the correlation between auditor reputation awareness and auditor independence. It was
hypothesised that auditors that have a higher level of reputation awareness will maintain their 
independence when facing a situation that could impair it. In this essay, that situation manifests in the 
auditor being intimidated by the client to adopt the client’s position in a disagreement on accounting 
treatment for the equipment in question.
A seven-item scale was developed as the reputation awareness scale. The dimensionality of 
the scale was tested by employing explanatory factor analysis (EFA) with principal component 
analysis (PCA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The reliability was assessed by employing 
Cronbach’s alpha and a composite reliability estimate. Meanwhile, the validity of the scale was 
assessed by employing an average variance extracted (AVE). Lastly, the correlation between auditor 
reputation awareness and auditor independence was tested by employing Pearson’s correlation.
The findings can be summarised as follows: First, EFA and CFA indicate that the auditor 
reputation scale is one-dimensional. Second, Cronbach’s alpha and the composite reliability estimate 
suggest that the scale has a satisfactory reliability level. Third, the AVE suggests that the scale has a
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 high validity level. Finally, the correlation analysis shows that the higher the auditors’ reputation 
awareness, the higher is their independence when facing client intimidation.
  
13
 4 CONCLUSIONS
 
This dissertation examined situations that can threaten auditor independence. Auditor independence is 
a cornerstone of the auditing profession. It promotes public confidence in the profession and 
consequently influences the viability of the future of the profession. Therefore, it is very important to 
examine how threats to independence could impair auditor independence and to identify the factors 
that may help prevent the impairment of it.
This dissertation investigated four of the five threats (self-interest, advocacy, familiarity, and 
intimidation) to auditor independence. This dissertation also investigated the impact of social 
pressures within an audit firm on auditor independence. These social pressures, while predicted to
impair auditor independence, have only received little attention in the literature. Additionally, several 
factors comprised of multi-dimensions of professional commitment, locus of control, perceived 
pressure, and reputation awareness were predicted to influence how auditors behave and make 
judgments when experiencing those threats and pressures.
This dissertation provides empirical evidence that certain independence threats and social 
pressures could impair auditor independence. Specifically, the findings show that social pressures
exerted by an audit partner or an audit manager, and by an auditor’s colleague, as well as intimidation 
by a client, could impair the auditor’s independence. This dissertation also provides evidence that all 
proposed factors, except for the perceived pressure, and could help prevent the impairment of auditor 
independence. Limitations and suggestions for future research are presented in each essay.
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Auditor independence is a cornerstone of the auditing 
profession and the basic principle that underpins the 
reputation of the auditing profession in the public eye. 
This dissertation consists of four interrelated essays 
concerned with auditor independence and aims to 
contribute both theoretically to the literature and 
practically to the auditing profession. The research 
questions in this dissertation were as follows: Would 
social pressures impair auditor independence in the 
setting of the “high power distance” and “collectivist” 
cultural dimensions? Is auditor independence impaired 
by a threat to self-interest caused by an auditor’s fee 
dependence to clients and a familiarity threat caused 
by long tenure? Is auditor independence impaired 
by an intimidation threat caused by a client’s threat 
to replace the auditor? Does a high level of auditor 
reputation awareness protect auditor independence, 
especially when facing client intimidation?
